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Long	read:	Can	the	UK	capitalise	on	its	service-based
economy	for	trade	diversification	post	Brexit?
As	concerns	increase	over	the	prospects	for	a	positive	post-Brexit
agreement	with	the	EU	on	the	terms	of	exit,	much	attention
continues	to	be	focused	on	the	attractiveness	and	viability	of	UK
trade	diversification.	Our	first	post	concluded	that	physical	distance
still	matters	in	economic	relations	between	countries	and	that	the
role	of	gravity	when	considering	trade	in	goods,	while	diminishing
slightly,	is	still	paramount.	This	suggests	that	the	EU’s	role	as	the
UK’s	most	proximate	and	natural	trading	partner	will	be	difficult	to	replace	with	countries	at	a	greater	physical
distance.	While	distance	still	matters	for	trade	in	goods,	can	the	same	be	said	for	trade	in	services?	Can	the	UK
capitalise	on	its	service-based	economy	for	trade	diversification	post-Brexit,	ask	Saul	Estrin,	Christine	Cote,
and	Daniel	Shapiro?
A	further	elaboration	of	the	concept	of	distance	which	captures	geographic	distance,	but	also	administrative,
economic	and	cultural	distance	(Ghemawat	2014)	paints	a	slightly	more	positive	picture	in	the	sense	that	the	UK	also
has	relatively	lower	“psychic	distance”	with	many	members	of	the	Commonwealth,	including	Canada.	Ghemawat’s
CAGE	distance	theory,	therefore,	lends	greater	weight	to	the	attractiveness	and	fit	of	trade	and	investment
diversification	with	certain	administratively	and	culturally	similar	markets	to	the	UK,	such	as	Canada.	However,	the
prospect	of	trade	diversification	beyond	the	EU	appears	even	more	attractive	when	we	consider	trade	in	services,	a
sector	which	accounts	for	80%	of	the	UK	economy	and	45%	of	total	UK	exports	(Office	of	National	Statistics	(ONS)).
The	balance	of	empirical	studies	suggests	that	physical	distance	matters	less	when	it	comes	to	trade	in	services	than
it	does	for	goods,	though	some	of	the	evidence	is	mixed.	Moreover,	it	is	unclear	to	what	extent	such	economic
relationships	might	replace	the	magnitude	of	returns	currently	achieved	through	EU	membership.	Nonetheless,	as
the	UK	contemplates	alternative	markets	with	which	it	might	pursue	trade	and	investment	post-Brexit,	the	idea	of
focusing	on	trade	in	services	with	a	country	like	Canada	seems	potentially	promising.
But	Services	by	their	very	nature	are	typically	more	intangible	and	complex	than	physical	goods	hence	the	rules
needed	to	ensure	that	the	barriers	to	trade	in	services	are	low	are	often	very	difficult	to	craft.	Can	the	UK	and	Canada
develop	an	Agreement	for	trade	in	services	which	provides	the	maximum	market	access,	generating	the	maximum
benefits	for	business	and	consumers?	Furthermore,	what	are	the	challenges	or	barriers	to	trade	such	an	agreement
would	need	to	address?	In	particular,	to	what	extent	do	the	state-of-the-art	service	agreements	recently	negotiated	or
under	discussion,	namely	the	EU-Canada	Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	Agreement	(CETA),	the	formally
named	Transpacific	Partnership	(now	CPTPP),	and	the	WTO	Trade	in	Services	Agreement	(TISA),	provide	guidance
for	the	crafting	of	new	Agreements?	Answers	must	take	account	of	the	fact	that	in	some	ways	even	these
Agreements	remain	deficient	in	recognizing	the	new	reality	of	the	fragmentation	of	production,	the	proliferation	of
global	value	chains	and	the	greater	integration	of	manufacturing,	services	and	investment	activity?
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Distance	matters	less	for	trade	in	services
It	is	clear	from	gravity	model	studies	which	posit	that	a	country’s	trade	patterns	depend	on	the	size	of	the	exporting
and	recipient	economies	and	the	distance	between	them,	that	trade	with	neighbors	will	be	greater	than	trade	with
countries	located	further	away.		Additionally,	distance	appears	to	play	an	even	more	marked	role	for	intermediate
than	final	goods,	‘an	important	component	of	supply	chains’	(Freeman	and	Pienknajura	2018).	When	we	turn
however	to	services,	the	story	is	slightly	different.	While	gravity	models	have	been	shown	to	fit	the	flow	of	trade	in
services	in	a	similar	manner	to	that	of	goods,	demonstrating	that	issues	such	as	the	income	of	a	country	and	a
common	language	positively	influence	trade	in	services,	distance	per	se	has	not	been	found	to	be	a	significant	factor
(Walsh	2008;	Kandilov	and	Grennes	2012).
Gravity	model	studies	also	show	for	example	that	trade	barriers	and	thus	costs	resulting	from	geographic	distance
are	much	lower	in	online	services	(Alaveras	and	Martens	2015)	and	that	trade	in	services	is	significantly	greater	in
virtually-proximate	countries,	especially,	trade	in	financial,	communication	and	insurance	services.	Therefore,	where
services	are	information-intensive,	they	have	been	found	to	be	‘highly	responsive	to	online	bilateral	information	flows’
(Hellmanzik	and	Schmitz	2016).	Moreover,	where	services	are	traded	through	a	commercial	presence,	such	as	R&D
based	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI),	and	involve	the	‘international	transfer,	absorption	and	use	of	knowledge’,	their
sensitivity	to	distance	is	significantly	less	than	with	manufacturing	FDI	(Castellani	et	al	2013).
However,	as	yet,	the	empirical	evidence	is	not	definitive	and	is	contingent	on	the	nature	of	the	services	in	question.
Some	studies	find	that	physical	distance	still	matters	for	trade	in	services	because	it	raises	the	costs	for	example	of
operating	across	differences	in	time	zones	(Christen	2018);	of	employing	foreign	service	workers;	or	it	increases
complexity	due	to	the	need	for	proximity	in	the	provision	of	many	services.	Even	in	these	studies	however,	either
while	costs	of	distance	were	present,	they	were	declining	(Christen	2017;	Head,	Mayer	and	Ries	2009),	or	while	the
effect	of	distance	on	trade	in	goods	and	services	were	both	significant,	the	impact	is	lower	in	the	case	of	services
(Eaton	and	Kortum	2018).
Services	are	a	growing	component	of	global	and	UK	economic	activity
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Thus,	distance	appears	to	matter	less	when	establishing	economic	trade	relations	focused	on	services,	particularly
those	which	rely	on	virtual	connectedness	between	countries	or	the	international	transfer	and	absorption	of
information.	How	might	this	benefit	the	UK	post-Brexit?	First,	evidence	suggests	that	there	has	been	considerable
growth	in	trade	in	services,	the	fastest	growing	sector	of	the	global	economy.		Such	growth	is	also	more	recent,	with
liberalization	in	services	under	the	General	Agreement	on	Trade	in	Services	(GATS)	taking	off	in	the	1990s	and	in
particular	in	the	area	of	digital	services	as	outlined	in	Figure	1.	The	importance	of	services	to	developed	and	many
emerging	market	economies	is	therefore	on	the	rise.		However,	while	the	services	component	of	output	or	GDP	is
quite	high	in	many	developed	countries,	the	services	share	of	total	world	trade	is	still	only	between	20-25%	according
to	a	2016	HSBC	Commercial	Banking	Report,	with	much	room	for	future	growth.
Figure	1:	Trade	in	services	is	increasing	rapidly
Source:	Erik	van	der	Marel,	https://sites.google.com/site/erikvandermarel/What-s-on
Second,	this	is	all	good	news	for	the	UK.	The	UK	is	a	predominantly	service	driven	economy	where	80%	of	output	is
services	based.	As	a	trading	nation,	45%	of	UK	exports	are	in	services	with	the	largest	share	in	professional	services
such	as	financial,	management	consulting	and	R&D	services.
Third,	when	considering	the	issue	of	trade	diversification	and	opportunities	with	countries	further	afield	such	as
Canada,	the	potential	is	evident.	For	example,	Canada’s	economy	is	also	highly	service	based	at	70%	of	GDP,	with
exports	and	imports	in	services	similarly	focused	on	knowledge-intensive	industries	such	as	management	consulting,
engineering,	architecture,	R&D	and	financial	services.	To	date,	however,	the	overall	level	of	trade	between	the	UK
and	Canada	is	quite	low	at	under	2%	of	the	total	value,	in	the	case	of	the	UK	and	around	6-7%	for	Canada	(Figure
2).	Not	surprisingly	the	majority	of	services	trade	for	the	UK	and	Canada	remains	with	their	immediate	neighbors.
50%	of	the	UK	services	exports	are	with	the	EU,	led	by	Germany	as	the	main	recipient.	The	US	currently	accounts
for	over	50%	of	Canada’s	services	trade.	However,	this	could	change	under	a	concerted	strategy	of	trade
diversification	by	the	UK	in	the	wake	of	Brexit.
Figure	2:	Trade	in	services	is	more	important	to	Canada
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The	gravity	model	provides	an	appropriate	starting	point	to	consider	the	untapped	potential	of	the	UK-Canada	trading
relationship.	In	a	recent	study,	van	der	Marel	considered	the	extent	to	which	Canada’s	existing	services	exports
differed	from	predictions	made	by	a	global	gravity	model,	which	was	estimated	based	on	the	World	Bank,	Trade	in
Services	Database,	World	Development	Indicators	and	Services	Trade	Restrictiveness	Index.	Based	on	his	analysis
of	factors	such	as	distance,	size	of	a	country’s	GDP	and	other	institutional	indicators,	he	found	evidence	(as	outlined
in	Figure	3),	that	Canada	is	currently	under-trading	in	services	with	a	number	of	key	trading	partners	including	the	UK
(van	der	Marel	2016).
Figure	3	
Overcoming	barriers	to	trade	in	services	with	countries	outside	the	EU
Given	the	potential	opportunity	for	the	UK	in	the	diversification	of	its	services	trade,	what	are	the	challenges?	The
first	type	of	challenge	relates	to	the	character	of	the	service	sector.	For	example,	services	as	a	product	are	often
subject	to	specific	constraints	such	as	the	requirements	for	close	physical	proximity	of	service	provider	and
consumer	(e.g.	after	sales	services	in	traditional	machine	building	such	as	aircraft	engines);	the	different	manner	in
which	services	are	regulated	(e.g.	professional	services	qualifications	differ	between	countries	and	even	across
provinces	within	Canada);	and	the	role	of	the	public	sector	in	the	supply	of	some	services	such	as	health	and
education	(Sauve	and	Roy	2016).
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Furthermore,	understanding	what	we	mean	by	services	can	be	challenging	as	services	can	involve	a	range	of
activities	which	make	it	difficult	to	provide	an	exact	definition.		The	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	has	classified
services	into	four	modes	of	supply	including	those	supplied	cross-border	such	as	computer	services	(mode	1),	those
consumed	abroad	such	as	through	tourism	(mode	2),	those	supplied	through	a	commercial	presence	such	as	an
automotive	branch	plant	or	MNE	subsidiary	(mode	3)	and	those	supplied	through	the	presence	of	a	natural	person
such	as	a	touring	rock	band	performing	a	concert	in	a	foreign	country	(mode	4).		Figure	4	outlines	the	way	in	which
the	different	types	of	services	are	supplied.
Figure	4:	Under	WTO	GATS,	services	are	supplied	under	four	modes
The	second	challenge	relates	to	the	way	services	are	regulated.	Trade	costs	in	services	are	two	to	three	times	higher
than	in	the	goods	sector.	They	have	remained	high	while	trade	costs	in	goods	have	fallen.	This	is	due	to	the
regulatory	burdens	facing	the	services	sector	even	in	the	single	market	of	the	EU	(Miroudot,	Sauvage	and	Shepherd
2013).		Policy	barriers	or	regulations	as	measured	by	the	World	Bank	Services	Trade	Restrictiveness	Indices	have	a
negative	and	significant	impact	on	total	services	trade	(van	der	Marel	and	Shepherd	2013),	and	remain	high	in
countries	like	the	UK	and	Canada	(Figure	5).
Figure	5
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The	third	challenge	is	that	service	liberalisation	agreements	are	much	harder	to	achieve	than	with	trade	in	goods.
The	impact	of	trade	policy	on	services	trade	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	services	transactions	are	harder	to
measure	than	with	goods	and	the	data	are	not	as	good.		Furthermore,	production	and	trade	in	goods	and	services
are	often	quite	integrated,	even	inseparable.	(Egger,	Larch	and	Staub	2012).	Therefore,	crafting	trade	in	services
agreements	which	can	overcome	barriers	effectively	is	very	difficult.
Policy	implications
Just	as	trade	in	services	has	increased	at	a	rapid	pace	in	the	last	few	decades,	so	have	the	rules	governing	it.	These
have	been	negotiated	at	the	regional	or	bilateral	level	as	well	as	multilaterally	at	the	WTO	under	GATS	and	the
ongoing	TISA.	The	WTO	currently	lists	285	active	regional	trade	agreements,	many	negotiated	during	the	period	of
rapid	growth	in	the	1990s.		The	majority	of	these	would	have	provisions	dealing	with	the	trade	in	services.	At	the
same	time,	the	nature	of	global	services	activity	has	been	changing.	The	way	that	services	flow	across	borders	has
been	fundamentally	altered	by	the	fragmentation	of	production	and	the	associated	emergence	of	global	value	chains,
as	well	as	the	integration	of	production	networks	facilitated	by	services	including	transport,	logistics,	telecoms,
marketing	and	R&D.	Cross-border	service	activity	has	also	become	more	significant	because	of		the	rise	in	the	digital
economy,	with	staggering	increases	in	the	number	of	internet	and	mobile	phone	users	and	the	explosion	in	data
flows.
In	considering	an	effective	set	of	policies	aimed	at	facilitating	trade	in	services	in	the	context	of	the	UK-Canada
relationship,	what	lessons	can	we	take	from	existing	state-of-the-art	services	trade	agreements	such	as	CETA,	TPP
and	TISA	and	to	what	extent	have	these	instruments	been	rendered	irrelevant	by	their	inability	to	address	these
changing	service	sector	dynamics?	New	trade	agreements	and	in	particular	CETA,	which	is	considered	the	gold
standard,	have	provisions	aimed	at	liberalizing	services	through	market	access	and	non-discriminatory	treatment	for
service	providers.	Sector-specific	provisions	deal	directly	with	sectors	such	as	financial	services,	telecommunications
and	air	transport	but	also	address	new	areas	such	as	e-commerce	and	maritime	transport	services.	Furthermore,
CETA	seeks	to	facilitate	the	provision	of	services	once	they	cross	the	border	through	rules	on	domestic	regulation	as
well	as	by	tackling	regulatory	cooperation	and	coherence	and	addressing	the	mutual	recognition	of	professional
qualifications.
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The	problem	is	that	CETA	and	other	services	agreements	continue	to	provide	for	special	treatment	for	countries’
sensitive	sectors,	allowing	them	to	maintain	market	access	restrictions	which	inhibit	trade	and	investment	flows.
Canada,	for	example,	has	preserved	costly	restrictions	in	the	transport,	finance	and	telecoms	sectors,	including
restrictions	and	regulatory	barriers	which	hinder	foreign	market	entry	and	competition	(van	der	Marel	2016).
Furthermore,	and	perhaps	more	importantly,	existing	rules	have	been	designed	to	address	the	exportation	of
services	as	a	final	activity	from	a	national	firm	and	not	as	an	intermediate	input	in	the	context	of	multiple	suppliers
and	locations	(Stephenson	2012).	The	current	trading	rules	for	services	found	within	even	the	newest	regional
agreements	or	at	the	WTO,	are	therefore	being	rendered	irrelevant	by	the	role	played	by	services	within	global	value
chains.
So	where	does	this	leave	the	UK	as	it	seeks	to	capitalise	on	new	and	diversified	opportunities	in	the	trade	in	services
with	economies	such	as	Canada?		A	number	of	possible	policy	approaches	will	need	to	be	considered.
First,	any	new	trade	agreements	the	UK	seeks	to	negotiate	should	address	services	trade	in	greater	breadth	and
depth	than	has	traditionally	been	the	case,	reflecting	the	more	recent	achievements	under	CETA	and	the	TPP.		The
UK	should	ensure	that	they	achieve	more	comprehensive	coverage	of	the	new	issues	discussed	above	which
recognise	the	role	of	services	in	global	value	chains,	as	well	as	that	of	technology	and	information,	flows	in	the
provision	of	services.	Ensuring	new	areas	such	as	e-commerce	are	covered	alongside	provisions	on	domestic
regulation	and	commitments	to	achieve	regulatory	cooperation	is	essential.
Second,	any	trade	agreements	negotiated	on	services	market	access	should	be	based	on	a	negative	list	approach,
covering	all	services	unless	explicitly	indicated.		Additionally,	they	should	seek	to	allow	for	fewer	exemptions	and
restrictions	than	for	example	under	CETA,	particularly	in	sectors	where	the	UK	has	a	comparative	advantage	such	as
management	consulting	and	financial	and	R&D	services.	They	should	also	be	seeking	to	restrict	regulations	which
raise	costs	and	affect	sectors	where	services	are	important	inputs	such	as	transport,	telecoms	and	financial	services.
Third,	because	traditional	trade	rules	do	not	fully	recognise	the	reality	of	cross-border	service	activity	in	which
services	act	as	important	intermediary	inputs	in	global	value	chains,	the	UK	must	consider	other	complementary
policy	levers	for	reducing	regulatory	barriers	to	service	market	access.	To	this	end,	the	UK	should	seek	sectoral,
regional	and	multilateral	cooperation	initiatives	with	the	goal	of	achieving	coherence	in	regulations	and	avoiding
bottlenecks	in	GVCs.		Such	cooperation	initiatives	might	take	the	form	of	‘supply	chain	councils’	(Hoekman	2014)	or
regulatory	councils	modelled	on	CETA’s	Regulatory	Cooperation	Forum	(van	der	Marel	2016).
Our	next	post	will	look	in	some	detail	at	how	the	opportunities	of	trade	in	services	can	best	be	addressed	in	the
context	of	global	cities	and	the	extent	to	which	a	focus	on	cities	might	help	address	some	of	the	challenges	raised	in
this	blog.
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